Results tagged ‘ Hall Of Fame ’
Kent’s Defense Should Play No Part In His Hall Of Fame Credentials
- What difference does it make what position Jeff Kent played?
In certain cases defense can be a determining factor (or the factor in the case of Ozzie
Smith) for a player getting into the Hall of Fame; if a catcher puts up the offensive numbers to get into the Hall while enduring the physical stress; dealing with the pitchers; calling a game; and running the team on the field, then his offensive numbers shouldn’t be expected to be as good as a player from another position; but the constant talk about Jeff Kent being at or near the top of all the offensive numbers for a second baseman is perplexing because it shouldn’t matter. Kent was (at best) an average defensive second baseman; his defense or position shouldn’t be a factor in whether he is or isn’t voted into the Hall of Fame.
If Kent is elected, it will be because of his bat; but would he be such a sure-fire HOFer if he had been positioned 50 feet to the right and played first base instead of
second? What if he was shifted 110 feet to the left and was playing third base? Would he then be such a great candidate based on his offensive numbers? I can’t believe that Kent would’ve been much better or worse with the glove at another position than he was at second base; and if that’s the case, then his defensive position should have absolutely nothing to do with whether or not he’ll receive the sport’s ultimate honor.
Let’s say Kent was a third baseman instead of a second baseman; would he then be referred to in such a reverential tone? Ron Santo’s career numbers are very close to Kent’s, but Santo’s still waiting for the Hall of Fame call that he deserves and he was a five-time Gold Glove winner at third base; Kent wouldn’t have been a Gold Glove third baseman just like he wasn’t a Gold Glove second baseman. What would happen then?
There’s a difference between a player who is a second baseman and a player who’s playing
second base. Ryne Sandberg was a second baseman; Roberto Alomar was a second baseman; Bill Mazeroski was a second baseman; Jeff Kent was a player whose bat needed to be in the lineup and second base was as good a place as any to put him since he could do the least amount of damage defensively and play the position passably, try hard and turn a good double play while driving in plenty of runs. This is why the positional argument doesn’t make sense anywhere but catcher.
Let’s take another example. What if a team looks at a Nick Swisher-type hitter and his power/on base combination and says, “we need a center fielder; he’s not that great at the position, but I’ll live with his defense as long as he hits 25-30 homers and gets on base at a .350-.370 clip.” So, he plays center field for the rest of his career and ends up with 400 homers and numbers similar to those of Jim Edmonds. Edmonds has a case for being a Hall of Famer with his offensive numbers and superlative defense; but the Swisher-type player’s below average center field play would keep him from getting any recognition despite his offensive numbers. He wouldn’t get any support as a Hall of Famer because it would be known that he wasn’t a good center fielder; he was just out there through necessity and that there was nowhere else to put him. But say someone said, “let’s make him
a second baseman” and he worked very hard, learned to turn the double play and ended up in the same ballpark defensively as Kent; what would the view of him be then? Would he be called a “great hitting second baseman” and get support because of a random position switch?
Kent is being given credit for something that had very little to do with his defense and a great deal to do with what was convenient. He wasn’t a bad defensive second baseman, but he shouldn’t be given credit for playing that position since his defense wouldn’t have been any worse had he been playing first base, third base or left field. In most cases, players are either elected because of their all around game or because of their bats and with Jeff Kent, his average defense shouldn’t enter into the equation because he wasn’t a second baseman, he was a guy playing second base who happened to put up big numbers while there.
- Mark McGwire’s estranged brother hawks a book proposal:
Until Jay McGwire slithered out of the brush, the only brother of Mark McGwire I was aware
of was the failed NFL quarterback Dan McGwire. Let me say right here that the only way this book “detailing” Mark’s PED usage is going to see the light of day is through self-publishing or print-on-demand; even if that’s the case, no one’s going to buy it. The story itself has become tiresome; I don’t think anyone who previously might’ve been interested in the story is paying close enough attention now to want to read a book that sounds like the juiciest (heh) bits are going to be in the proposal and on the dustjacket; and Jay McGwire’s motives are, shall we say, dubious given his statements. The most laughable of which is the following (culled from ESPN.com):
“Mark is a man I think most would like to forgive because his reason
wasn’t nefarious — it was for survival,” he wrote, according to the
proposal. “My bringing the truth to surface about Mark is out of love.
I want Mark to live in truth to see the light, to come to repentance so
he can live in freedom — which is the only way to live. “
There’s a self-righteous and dogmatic nature to the above statement that looks designed to cast Jay in a newly-found religious light; the transparency of this entire charade is clear: Jay McGwire saw that Kirk Radomski got a book deal as the interest in this sordid affair wanes to the point of non-existence and is
trying to cash in and use buzzwords as “repentance” and “freedom” to garner attention for his proposal. A few years ago, a publishing house might’ve rolled the dice with a small printing of this manuscript to see if anyone bought it, but the state of the publishing industry along with the economy is going to land this book proposal not in the slush pile, but in the circular file where it belongs.
- Mets sign Freddy Garcia to a minor league deal:
The Mets and Yankees were said to be the last two teams standing for Freddy Garcia as
he decided where he wanted to try and play; the Mets were probably the choice because Garcia saw a better chance of making the starting rotation in Queens. This is a low risk signing for the Mets that shouldn’t be seen as anything more than throwing something at the wall and hoping it sticks.
Garcia was remarkably durable during his first eight seasons with the Mariners and White Sox and that workload and durability has caught up to him as he’s pitched poorly in 14 games over the past two years for the Phillies and Tigers. Garcia’s injury issues also popped up in the
Venezuelan Winter League as he tried to prove to interested teams that he’s finally healthy. The reports have insisted that Garcia’s recent health woes are muscular and not structural; we’ll see.
Garcia’s mechanics were never particularly smooth (he makes a very long circle with his arm as he draws it back and lands on a stiff front leg with little leg drive), and he’s going to be 34 in June. Even if he makes the Mets rotation and stays relatively healthy, I wouldn’t expect much use from him. If the Mets think this is going to solve the problem of the middle of their rotation, they’re in for a big surprise; continuing to pursue Oliver Perez or Ben Sheets and making sure they get one of them would be the wisest course of action with or without Garcia.
A Stat That May Or May Not Exist To Judge Jeff Kent, Among Others
As I’ve stated numerous times, I’m no stat geek, but the talk about Jeff Kent’s numbers
being such that he should be a no doubt Hall of Famer have got me to wondering if some enterprising nerd could come up with a way to determine whether Barry Bonds’s presence as a lineup bodyguard for Kent gave him such an advantage that there would be a reason to question his qualifications had he not had Bonds in the same lineup for six seasons.
The recent vitriol launched at Jim Rice and Andre Dawson and the prevailing feeling among stat guys who insist that neither player belongs in the Hall of Fame makes me wonder what would happen if things were turned the opposite way with a player that they support like Kent. If Rice’s home/road splits and the number of outs he made are enough of a reason to keep him out; and if Dawson’s .323 career on base percentage is the yoke around his
neck, then what happens if a number is formulated to judge Kent during the Giants years without Bonds and it’s determined that he no longer cuts it?
What if those numbers are adjusted and they wind up closer to Lou Whitaker instead of Ryne Sandberg? Would Kent then be a “no doubt” Hall of Famer? Whitaker has legitimate HOF credentials, but was absurdly only on the ballot for one year in which he received less than 3% of the vote and was eliminated from subsequent ballots. What would’ve happened with Whitaker’s numbers had he been in a lineup with Barry Bonds for six years of his career? There may already be a stat to account for this, but if there
is, no one seems to be using it to support Kent’s candidacy.
The stat could be called something like Numbers In A Lineup Containing A Lesser Player, or NIAL-CALP. (That’s pretty clunky, but you get the idea.) Digging up statistics and formulating algorithms isn’t my bag, but if anyone’s looking for a true way to judge Jeff Kent’s career and put the argument to rest one way or the other, then that’s the way to do it, because to me, if there wasn’t a Barry Bonds next to Kent in the lineup, Kent might’ve wound up in Hall of Fame limbo with Whitaker, or worse.
Jeff Kent Retires
- Jeff Kent is set to announce his retirement–let the Hall of Fame debate begin and
last for five long years:
“We got what for David Cone? Jeff who?!? That’s all?!?”
This was the overwhelming reaction on August 27th-28th, 1992 when the news of the Mets trade of David Cone to the Blue Jays broke and spread throughout New York. If someone had said, on the day of that trade and the subsequent four years that Kent spent with the Mets, that one of the three players involved in the deal (Kent, Cone and Ryan Thompson) would be heading toward the Hall of Fame, Cone would’ve been the first
obvious candidate and, in looking at Thompson’s power potential, tools and bluster, he would’ve been mentioned ahead of Kent as well. Since then, Kent has become, in some circles, a no-doubt Hall of Famer even with his abrasive personality that wore on teammates, media and management. Despite what anyone says in retrospect, nobody saw that coming.
Jeff Kent was a 20th round draft pick of the Blue Jays in 1989 out of the University of California. His minor league numbers showed great potential; but what has to be understood during those all too recent times was that there weren’t as many people paying close attention to the stats of minor league players; nor were such stats available at the click of a button. Those that wanted to sift through those numbers and find
such potentially great hidden gems either had too much time on their hands, didn’t have the issue of maintaining a life to get in the way, or both.
When the Mets traded for Kent, GM Al Harazin was already under fire for being the architect of “The Worst Team Money Could Buy”; he was known as a financial/business guy in the Mets front office who found himself thrust into the spotlight when Joe McIlvaine took the Padres GM job in 1991; looking back, Cone, at age 29 could have yielded a greater on paper return than Kent and Thompson; and this was before the precedent of non-contending teams trading impending free agents for prospects became such a common and accepted practice; but it also shows that no matter who’s making the deals or why, there’s no way of knowing what a prospect is going to become.
Did Harazin see Kent’s numbers and say, “this guy’s gonna be a player”? Probably not;
my guess is he got a couple of good reports from his scouts on Kent and Thompson (and if I had to guess, I’d say Thompson was considered more of a blue chipper than Kent) and made the move quickly before the press got the word that Cone was on the market. Kent’s personality irritated the Mets veterans as he very quickly gained the reputation of a loner who was better off being ignored and that never changed throughout his career.
On the field with the Mets, Kent was an okay player; nothing great and he did little to indicate that he’d develop the way he did. He looked like a guy who’d hit his 20 homers; drive in his 80 runs; play passable defense at second base; and be easily replaceable when the time came. It’s also conveniently forgotten that it wasn’t just the Mets that let Kent go; the Mets made a move that was universally applauded late in the 1996 season when Carlos Baerga—-an All Star second baseman who was considered in a class (although
a notch below) Roberto Alomar, and in the midst of what looked like an off year—-became available for Kent and Jose Vizcaino. There was no reason to expect Baerga to collapse the way he did at age 28 for the Mets and decline into the journeyman that he became. Kent had 10 extra base hits in 39 games with the Indians late in the 1996 season and did nothing in the playoffs; the Indians turned around and traded Kent, Vizcaino and Julian Tavarez to the Giants for Matt Williams. It was in San Francisco that Kent found his alter ego (on and off the field) in Barry Bonds.
As despised as Bonds was by teammates and the media, Kent was as, if not more, reviled. The reason the two were said to hate each other with such a passion (that occasionally became physical, both publicly and privately) was that they were mirror images of each other; but on the
field, they (like other sets of teammates who hated each other, Ron Cey and Steve Garvey for example) created magic. Would Kent have become the statistical Hall of Famer he became without that shotgun marriage to Bonds? Did Giants GM Brian Sabean predict that was going to happen? It’s hard to imagine that being the case, but that’s how it turned out. Kent won an MVP and put up huge RBI totals with Bonds as his teammate.
When he left the Giants to join the Astros and Dodgers as he wound down his career, he still put up big numbers, but not as big as he did with Bonds. Kent was a prime example of a player who evolved to the best of his ability and took advantage of a historic player buttressing him and allowing him to put up the numbers that took him from a guy who was considered a
workmanlike cog in a machine into a likely Hall of Famer.
Kent is so stubborn, so difficult to deal with, that admitting Bonds’s contribution would be the equivalent of waterboarding
himself, but it can’t be denied that he wouldn’t have become the RBI machine he was without Bonds, and without Bonds he wouldn’t even be considered a Hall of Famer.
The ironic part of all of that will be seen in five years as there will still be a debate as to whether Bonds is going to be voted into the Hall of Fame because of his perceived guilt in using performance enhancing drugs (and he’s still going to be waiting for an induction that may never come), but Kent will either be elected or be close to election with the ultimate honor to come within another couple of years. Will Kent admit Bonds’s contribution privately? Or will his irascible nature cling to the inaccurate belief that he would’ve made it anyway, even though he wouldn’t have.
- Baseball should step in and expedite the sale of the Padres to Jeff Moorad:
You know things are bad when veterans clinging to their last year or two in the big
leagues are spurning the Padres for deals elsewhere; deals in which they’re going to get far less playing time than they would’ve in San Diego. Such is the case with Brad Ausmus and Omar Vizquel.
Ausmus signed with the Dodgers rather than the Padres and unless Russell Martin gets hurt, Ausmus will be lucky to get 150 at bats next year as his backup because Dodgers manager Joe Torre rides his starting catcher every single day with rare off days sprinkled infrequently throughout the season. The Padres wanted Ausmus to tutor young Nick Hundley, but the prospect of going through a season that promises to be historically hideous must not have appealed to Ausmus as much as playing for a team that should be hanging around contention like the Dodgers. (The Padres responded by signing the solid veteran Henry Blanco to fill the role as backup/tutor for Hundley.)
In Vizquel’s case, the Padres had interest in him being their shortstop but he chose to take a minor league deal with the Rangers knowing that his main job is to be a backup and tutor to 19-year-old prospect Elvis Andrus and help the rookie essentially cut into Vizquel’s playing time. At their ages, Ausmus and Vizquel look like they decided that they’d rather have a chance to win a few more games than suffer with a team that’s not going to have anyone watching them; is going to lose 100+ games; and is in front office turmoil.
Baseball should step in and get the Padres sale to Jeff Moorad done as quickly as possible for the good of the franchise. Things are supposedly moving along, but every day that the Padres are functioning knowing that they have the sale hanging over their heads is another day that there
can’t be a new start without the current management in place. This situation is different from that of the soon-to-be-sold Cubs because the Cubs, while keeping an eye on their payroll, are cutting some big salaries (Jason Marquis, Mark DeRosa) to acquire other big salaries (Milton Bradley). The Padres are a different story. They’ve been destroyed by the ineptitude of Sandy Alderson and his heavy-handed grandstanding and they’re not even able to attract players who would usually just be happy to have the job. It’s bad for baseball to have a team with literally no chance of competing and, while it’s on the way to being rectified, they’re going to have to endure a year worse than 2008 on and off the field and once Moorad takes over, it’s going to be that much harder for him to repair the fissures that this mess has created.
An Underappreciated Part Of Rickey Henderson’s Game
Given how many bases he stole, one thing that people don’t appreciate
about Rickey Henderson was his durability. Of course there were the
incidents of Henderson (before “Manny Being Manny” became part of the
everyday lexicon, “Rickey Being Rickey” was a viable saying because of
his quirks) sitting out because of his “hammy” as he referred to his
hamstring; and throwing tantrums because he felt he was underpaid. (The
“Bash Brothers” Athletics had a “Rickey-fund” with a jar full of dollar
bills in the early 90s because of one such tantrum.) Even with all of
that, I don’t think people appreciate what kind of a toll Henderson’s
game puts on a player’s body.
In addition to the travel, the
length and marathon nature of a baseball season,
Henderson stole so many bases and went diving hard into so many bases
that by all
rights, he should’ve gotten hurt on some part of his body
other than an occasional pulled “hammy”. Not only was the sprinting
involved in stealing bases a toll-taker on the body, but how many times
did he get hit with the ball as he was diving in? Jammed
some part of his body running into the bases (they’re hard inserted into the ground with little give), or an infielder’s knees? Received a
harder-than-necessary tag on one part of his body or another from an
intensely competitive opponent?
And the constant attention
that was paid to Henderson as he was on the bases—-with the pick-off
plays and dives back into the bases—-were physically exhausting and almost equal with the mental strain of studying the pitcher, the
catcher, the infielders and the opposing coaches
and managers to see
what they were going to try and pull. Plus Henderson lasted until he
was 44-years-old and (to the best of my research) never had any
surgical procedures on any part of his body.
Henderson was the greatest
basestealer in history (just ask him), but he was also remarkably tough.
The stories of Rickey being difficult for managers (specifically Tony
La Russa, Lou Piniella and Bobby Valentine) are a dime a dozen, but all
appreciated how hard he played—-mentally and physically—-and what he brought to the table because he brought it every single day.
- Ryan Madson puts his money where his mouth is:
Ryan Madson turned down a Phillies offer of 3-years, $12 million to
avoid arbitration and his
first two years of free agency and you have
to admire that he’s bypassing the security for the opportunity to make
a load of money next year as either a closer or set-up man. It takes
guts to risk one’s livelihood when the money’s sitting there on the
table and Madson’s had arm trouble in the past; his motion isn’t exactly
clean and guys with stiff-legged, herky-jerky motions like
Madson does are an injury-risk, but there won’t be the glut of closers
available next year and Madson could get himself a load of money if he
has another big year setting up for Brad Lidge and the economic situation is a bit better. It helps that he’s
going to get a nice raise in arbitration this year, but the easiest
thing for him to do would be to take the money now, but he turned it
down to go for big money.
- What was the holdup in the firing of Tampa Bay Buccaneers coach Jon Gruden?
It took three weeks from the end of the NFL season for the Glazer
family to come to the
conclusion that they didn’t want Jon Gruden to
move forward coaching the team? They had to fire him now on
Championship Weekend and after most teams have come very close to
filling their jobs to prevent Gruden from getting another job? Unless
something happened in the time from the end of the season (a season in
which, in fairness, the Bucs collapsed) to now, why would the Bucs wait
so long? Bucs co-chairman Joel Glazer made the following comments
(culled from ESPN):
“Any time a season ends, especially the way our season ended, it’s a
very, very emotional time. And one thing we always like to do is not
act on emotion, let things simmer down, think through things carefully
and not make any quick, rash decisions,” Glazer said.
“After
taking a lot of time to look at our franchise, look where it’s been,
look where it is, look where we want to go, we just felt this was the
time for a change.”
Fair enough, but it takes three weeks to come to this
conclusion? In that time, do you mean to tell me that they really
hadn’t decided that they wanted to make a change? And it’s not like
they’re hiring a Hall of Fame coach to replace him; the reports have
them again promoting defensive backs coach (who was recently promoted
to defensive coordinator) Raheem Morris to head coach. GM Bruce Allen
was also fired, so now the Bucs are installing a new coach and GM and
relegating their former employees to scrounging for another job because
they waited so long to fire them.There’s more to this than the Sandy Alderson-like crap that Glazer spewed in that interview.
Had they fired Gruden right after the season ended, the Jets, who
are still interested in bringing back Brett Fav-ruh, would absolutely
have at least wanted to talk to Gruden, who worked well with Fav-ruh in
Green Bay and had shown mutual interest in reuniting in Tampa
before
Fav-ruh wound up with the Jets. It looks like they got angry at Gruden
and screwed him intentionally by doing this now.
The only time I remember a coach getting axed so late was when San
Diego Chargers GM A.J. Smith fired Marty Schottenheimer; but there’s no
way to compare the two situations. Smith wasn’t speaking to
Schottenheimer and, even though the Chargers had gone 14-2 in the
previous season, both coordinators—-Cam Cameron and Wade Phillips—-got
head coaching jobs and it made no sense to let a coach that Smith
wanted out anyway hire new coordinators and continue as coach. Firing Schottenheimer made
sense by then. This decision to axe Gruden is just bizarre considering the amount of time it took.
This gets me to thinking of other similar wishy-washy firings that teams have made, specifically the Mets firing of Willie Randolph. I totally understand financial considerations and that many times the front office doesn’t want to be seen as assessing “blame” for a team’s failings, but that’s part of the job of being in the front office of any team. The Mets had people in the organization who blamed Randolph for the 2006 NLCS loss to the Cardinals; they also had strong organizational calls for his firing after the 2007 collapse. GM Omar Minaya, undoubtedly concerned that it would be seen as heaping the entirety of the situation on Randolph’s shoulders, resisted firing his manager. In retrospect, they should’ve pulled the trigger after the 2007 season if that’s what they really felt needed to be done because the whole embarrassing
midnight firing in California could’ve been avoided with a quick-strike decision.
Nothing is to be gained by holding back on firing someone if that’s what the front office feels it wants to do. If the decision is made, there should be no vacillation. Concerns about the manager coming back to “haunt” his former team shouldn’t play into it; a desire to really screw the guy (as it appears, on the surface, to be what the Bucs are doing) is just petty.
Do you think the Phillies are sitting around and rehashing the firing of Terry Francona since he’s become such a success with the Red Sox? The truth is that Francona wasn’t a very good manager for that Phillies team. He didn’t have much talent
around him and he didn’t do a good job; now he’s in a situation where he’s managing a team more suited to his personality as an overseer and steers the ship with help from the front office. The White Sox fired Tony La Russa based on the decision of a ridiculous GM in Hawk Harrelson. If Jerry Reinsdorf felt that Harrelson was the man to run his club, then he can’t look back and regret that he allowed Harrelson to fire La Russa, as stupid as it was.
The decision was made; it didn’t work. Move on. Joe Torre got fired three times before he got to the Yankees, and his record (with the Mets and Cardinals anyway) indicated that while he may not have deserved to get fired considering the circumstances, nor had he earned the right to stay; and it’s the same with Randolph. He was treated shabbily with his firing, but it has to be remembered that it was the Mets who gave him an opportunity to manage after so many failed interviews.
At first glance, the Gruden firing looks like a vindictive type of deal and
not actually the crud that Glazer’s putting out there. Maybe more will come out as to what really happened, but this is a shabby way of doing things if it’s as it appears. Then, what can you expect from the Bucs, who, when they fired Tony Dungy, had security escort him from the building. Tony Dungy—-probably one of the most gentle and gentlemanly men ever to be involved with the NFL—-had security escort him from the Bucs complex; that’s pretty much all you need to know about the Glazers and how they run their franchises and treat their employees.
- NFL Picks:
Depending on how you look at it, I either had a bad last week or a bad last week rescued by
one highlight. I got three games wrong, but I did pick the Cardinals to beat the Panthers.
AFC Championship: Pittsburgh Steelers 27-Baltimore Ravens 13
NFC Championship: Arizona Cardinals 14-Philadelphia Eagles 6
Current Players—Hall Of Famers Or Not?
All of this Hall of Fame talk has made me think about current players and whether or not
they’re going to be automatic HOFers or are going to have to wait as long as Jim Rice did. The following lists are broken up team-by-team (and if a player is an unsigned free agent, he’s listed with the team with whom he concluded 2008). The categories are as follows based on my opinion:
Automatic: meaning they’re already in no matter what else they do.
Likely: if they have two or three more big years, they’ll get in.
Borderline: depending on the voter’s moods and interpretations.
On The Way: Too early in their careers to be automatic, but well on the way.
PED Questionable: if their possible usage of performance enhancers will keep them out even though they have the numbers.
No: They’re not getting in.
- Tampa Bay Rays: None applicable.
- Boston Red Sox:
Dustin Pedroia—-On The Way: A Rookie of the Year and an MVP in his first two seasons, plus a World Series win and a Gold Glove.
Josh Beckett—-On The Way: Two World Series wins; World Series MVP; ALCS MVP; if he strings together some 15-17 win years with a couple of 20s in there, he’ll get in easily.
Jonathan Papelbon—-On The Way: Will be recognized as the best closer in baseball once Mariano Rivera retires and the mantle is passed.
David Ortiz—-Borderline: He’ll have to start another 3-5 year streak of the massive numbers
he put up from 2003-2007; that he’s a pure DH will hurt his candidacy.
Curt Schilling—-Likely: Schilling’s going to be a fascinating case study because he’s not particularly well-liked and his post-season resume is great, but his numbers may not really be there to make it as an automatic. He’ll get in eventually and have to wait awhile to do it. I’d advise him to just keep his mouth shut and not complain, but he won’t listen and whining might keep him out entirely depending on how far he goes with it.
- New York Yankees:
Derek Jeter—-Automatic: The Yankees captain; will have at least 3500 hits before he’s done; etc. etc.
Alex Rodriguez—-Automatic: No explanation needed.
Jorge Posada—-Likely: A catcher with his power numbers? Far better than Carlton Fisk
ever was.
Mike Mussina—-Automatic: I’ve made my case for him before. An innings-eating winner who is having his inability (before 2008) to win 20 games unfairly scrutinized.
Andy Pettitte—-Borderline: He has a case, but that he played for such a great team will lead to the implication that he was along for the ride despite his post-season success. A very high ERA as well.
Ivan Rodriguez—-PED Questionable: His power numbers fell off the planet at the exact time they started testing for PEDs. He’s not getting in despite deserving numbers.
Mark Teixeira—-On The Way: He might wind up with 600 homers and a stack of Gold Gloves, plus he’s well-liked.
C.C. Sabathia—-On The Way: Has 117 wins and is still only 28. Will get to 300 wins if he stays healthy.
Roy Halladay—-Likely: Two or three more seasons of 15-18 wins should do it.
- Baltimore Orioles: None applicable.
- Chicago White Sox:
Jermaine Dye—-No: If he hangs around long enough to hit another 150 homers, he’ll be in the Andre Dawson-boat; I don’t think Dye’s a viable candidate.
Jim Thome—-Likely: The one thing that could keep him out are the era of PEDs, even though he’s never been mentioned as a culprit. I think he’s a HOFer without question.
Mark Buehrle—-On The Way: Laugh if you want, but he’s an innings-eating winner who’s going to rack up 250+ wins if he continues his current pace; a very respectable ERA for the time.
- Minnesota Twins:
Joe Mauer—-On The Way: A catcher who puts up those average and on base numbers? All he has to do is stay healthy.
Justin Morneau—-On The Way: An RBI machine who’s starting to become an annual MVP
candidate.
Joe Nathan—-Borderline: It’s hard to judge closers, but his numbers have been brilliant in recent years. He’ll have to maintain them into his late 30s to have a shot. He may get lost in the shuffle.
- Cleveland Indians:
Grady Sizemore—-On The Way: His numbers will warrant it with the power/on base combination; plus he’s going to rack up the Gold Gloves.
- Kansas City Royals: None applicable.
- Detroit Tigers:
Miguel Cabrera—-On The Way: He’ll end up with over 600-700 homers and even if he
spends the last ten years of his career as a DH, he can’t be denied entry.
Magglio Ordonez—-No: If he gets to 400+ homers, he’ll have a shot; I don’t see it
.
Gary Sheffield—-PED Questionable: The numbers will warrant it, but his reputation and that he was involved with BALCO may keep him out entirely.
- Los Angeles Angels:
Vladimir Guerrero—-Automatic: An annual MVP candidate who’s probably going to hit 600 homers and get well over 3000
hits.
Torii Hunter—-No: Respectable hitting numbers and a Gold Glove winner year-after-year, but he’s more closely comparable to Mike Cameron than he is to Andre Dawson.
- Texas Rangers: None applicable.
- Oakland Athletics:
Matt Holliday—-On The Way: If he proves he can put up the numbers away from Coors Field, he’ll end his career with over 400 homers, a career .300 batting average and a high OBP.
Jason Giambi—-PED Questionable/No: He may end his career with close to 500 homers, but even though he was the only guy to stand up and tell the truth, his poor defense and declining batting average will counteract his power/on base numbers even if he’d been clean.
- Seattle Mariners:
Ichiro Suzuki—-Automatic: He’ll have a .320 career batting average, a Rookie of the Year and an MVP, plus he’s going to get close to 3000 hits in the States. I don’t think he’s as productive as he could be (he’s a pure singles hitter), but the numbers can’t be denied.
- Philadelphia Phillies:
Ryan Howard—-Borderline: He started his big league career relatively late; strikes out so much and his batting average will be mediocre, but if he continues hitting homers at the rate he does, he’ll have a Reggie Jackson/Willie Stargell-like case.
Chase Utley—-Likely: If his hip problem doesn’t hamper him, he’s only going to get better
and he’s already a truly great hitter, possibly the best in baseball.
Jimmy Rollins—-Borderline: He could go the Alan Trammell route and be ignored; or he could go the Ryne Sandberg route and make it. He’s going to have to put up a few more years similar to his MVP year of 2007.
Jamie Moyer—-No: In the boat with David Wells as having some credentials, but not really being close.
- New York Mets:
Carlos Delgado—-PED Questionable: Delgado’s never been mentioned seriously as having been a suspicious character, but he may get caught up in the wave of guys being kept out and wind up in the netherworld of Fred McGriff. He’ll have the power numbers, but may have to wait awhile to get in and may find himself forgotten even though he’s got the credentials.
David Wright—-On The Way: All he has to do is stay healthy.
Jose Reyes—-On The Way: He’ll have the stolen base and all around hitting numbers to warrant induction if he stays healthy.
Carlos Beltran—-Likely: He should get close to 500 homers with a stack of Gold Gloves and a high enough batting average/OBP to make him a lock.
Johan Santana—-On The Way: He’ll have to get to 200 wins, but with
two Cy Young Awards and the strikeout numbers, he’ll get in.
Billy Wagner—-No: He’s along the lines of John Franco and Lee Smith, good closers who aren’t worthy of the ultimate honor.
Pedro Martinez—-Automatic: Three Cy Young Awards and pure dominance when he was at his best.
- Florida Marlins:
Hanley Ramirez—-On The Way: He’ll have massive offensive numbers before he’s done.
Luis Gonzalez—-PED Questionable: Looked at on their own, Gonzalez has similar credentials to Jim Rice, but his sudden burst of power at the time it happened makes him an unlikely candidate to get any consideration whatsoever.
- Atlanta Braves:
John Smoltz—-Automatic: Brilliant starter and a great closer with a post-season resume beyond compare.
Tom Glavine—-Automatic: Two Cy Young Awards, 300+ wins, etc.
Brian McCann—-On The Way: It’s a bit early in his career, but with the power numbers he puts up as a catcher, he’ll make it if he stays healthy.
Chipper Jones—-Automatic: A switch hitter with the power numbers, batting average and on base numbers he’ll have? First ballot easily.
- Washington Nationals: None applicable.
- Chicago Cubs:
Derrek Lee—-On The Way: He’ll get over 400 homers and possibly close to 500 with a bunch of Gold Gloves and a high batting average/OBP.
Aramis Ramirez—-On The Way: He’ll get close to 500 homers and there are so few third
basemen in the HOF, that he’ll have a legitimate case by the time he’s done.
Alfonso Soriano—-No: Could have a case with his total number of homers, but his defense is atrocious and his OBP/batting average will probably put him in the Vada Pinson category of not quite.
Jim Edmonds—-Borderline: Has a surprisingly strong case with his defense and power numbers, but it’s going to be tough for him to ge
t the support.
- Milwaukee Brewers:
Prince Fielder—-On The Way: He’ll be a DH in the American League sooner rather than later, but he could get close to 600 homers unless he gets too fat to swing the bat.
Ryan Braun—-On The Way: 71 homers, a .300 batting average and a flair for the dramatic after two years in the big leagues, he’s just got to keep it up.
- Houston Astros:
Lance Berkman—-Automatic: An unknown superstar whose
power/OBP/batting average numbers go up every single year.
Miguel Tejada—-PED Questionable: Will have viable numbers (especially for a shortstop), but he’s not going to get much, if any, support.
Carlos Lee—-Borderline: He could get to 450 homers with a solid batting average, respectable OBP and huge RBI totals, but he may get lost in the shuffle.
Roy Oswalt—-On The Way: If he gets to 200+ wins, he’ll make it.
- St. Louis Cardinals:
Albert Pujols—-Automatic: Don’t be silly.
- Cincinnati Reds: None applicable.
- Pittsburgh Pirates: None applicable.
- Los Angeles Dodgers:
Manny Ramirez—-Automatic: One of the best pure hitters ever.
Russell Martin—-On The Way: He’ll have an easier time if he’s left behind the plate, which is currently being debated whether or not that’s going to happen.
Jeff Kent—-Likely: People talk as if he’s automatic, but much of
his success was attributable to hitting behind Barry Bonds. He may have to wait awhile, but will get in eventually.
Nomar Garciaparra—-PED Questionable: Became injury-prone and his numbers absolutely collapsed after 2003.
Greg Maddux—-Automatic: He might get close to the Tom Seaver level of nearly 100% support.
- Arizona Diamondbacks:
Randy Johnson—-Automatic: In the same boat as Maddux only overpowering and frightening—-Sandy Koufax-level dominance.
Brandon Webb—-On The Way: If he stays healthy, he’ll have the numbers and the hardware.
- Colorado Rockies:
Todd Helton—-PED Questionable: He’ll easily have the offensive numbers, but what’s happened to his power in the last four years? It can’t be attributed to the Colorado-humidor alone.
- San Francisco Giants:
Omar Vizquel—-Likely: A defensive wizard with enough of a bat to get in. May have to wait a few years.
Tim Lincecum—-On The Way: He has to stay healthy, a big question mark.
- San Diego Padres:
Adrian Gonzalez—-On The Way: Already a superstar that few are aware of. Before his career is over, he’ll have at least one MVP, a stack of Gold Gloves and excellent power numbers.
Jake Peavy—-On The Way: He has to stay healthy; with his current
team, he might find himself in a Bert Blyleven situation unless he goes to a better, more supportive team and racks up some wins.
Trevor Hoffman—-Borderline: Talked about as an automatic, but may have to wait awhile—-longer than Goose Gossage and Bruce Sutter did. He may get caught up in the glut of closers and not make it.
Stat Geeks’ Criteria For The Hall Of Fame Rewards Selfishness
In 1988, when Gregg Jefferies arrived in the big leagues at 19-years-old and helped the
Mets blast their way to a division title that, until September, was in doubt, he was tolerated by the veterans in the clubhouse because he was helping them win. The next season, the trouble started because of Jefferies’s immaturity; perceived selfishness; tantrums; and status as “teacher’s pet” of manager Davey Johnson. Things spiraled downward as even the players who considered themselves the epitome of “team-first” attitude like Tim Teufel and Howard Johnson shook their heads in disgust at the pampered rookie.
Looking back, it’s easy to understand how Jefferies wound up being so self-centered. His father was his high school coach; he tore his way through the minor leagues; he had gorgeous mirror-image swings from both sides of the plate; and his defensive flaws were tolerated by a manager and front office who looked at his potential and allowed him to get away with helmet-flinging, cussing and childish behaviors despite the negative effect it was having on the rest of the team.
The biggest problem Jefferies engendered was the attention he paid to his numbers. Players like Johnson and Teufel—-who saw themselves as subservient to the team’s goals—-resented Jefferies’s selfish focus on how many hits he got and how close he was to breaking all of Pete Rose’s records on his
way to the Hall of Fame. It’s this kind of attitude that is a detriment to a team having on-field chemistry and winning, as opposed to a group of players thinking of themselves first and how each and every action they take is going to alter the future they’ve planned for themselves. I believe this type of attitude dovetails with the numbers that players require to get into the Hall of Fame; and if enshrinement is their ultimate goal, they’re more likely to do things on the field that may not help their team win in the now because their “immortality” is riding on raising their on base percentage by ten points.
Players who are being denied enshrinement because of a stat or because of some false notion that they don’t “deserve” to be Hall of Famers for one reason or another are being punished by the stat geeks and their criteria for what a Hall of Famer should be. Until
yesterday, Jim Rice was one such player. Another who is being punished for what he wasn’t instead of rewarded for what he was is Andre Dawson. Dawson’s on base percentage is seen as one of the main reasons why he “shouldn’t” be a Hall of Famer in the eyes of those who are obsessed with numbers; while his former teammate Tim Raines is having his virtues extolled for the similar numerical reasons. This is taking the circumstances and putting them grossly out of context. There are other aspects that have to be looked at aside from sheer numbers. Here they are:
- The managers:
The manager of the individual player should play a major part in whether said player should
be penalized for his absence of “Hall of Fame numbers”. When Dawson arrived in the big leagues to stay, his manager was Dick Williams. By most accounts, Dick Williams was a fine manager, a successful winner and able to control his clubhouse. He won four pennants including one in each league and two World Series with the Oakland Athletics dynasty in the early 70s; but Dick Williams was not a manager who was obsessed with on base percentage above all else. In looking at his teams, those that won and those that didn’t, he never had a group of players whose main focus was to get on base.
An old-school manager like Williams had roles for his players. The leadoff man (Raines
with the Expos) was there to get on base for the middle of the lineup (Dawson and Gary Carter). This was their stated job. The middle of the lineup was not advised to take pitches and walk to leave the job of driving in runs to the bottom of the lineup. If a young player arrives in the big leagues and a veteran manager tells him to swing the bat and drive in runs rather than take a bunch of pitches as the on base percentage advocates mandate, what’s he supposed to do? Is he going to defy his manager and wait and in the eyes of the manager, leave it up to the next guy, or is he going to start hacking at the first pitch he deems acceptable to drive in the runs?
In looking at the numbers of Williams’s teams from his first job with the “Impossible Dream” Red Sox of the late 60s; to the A’s in the 70s; then later to the Expos, Padres and Mariners, he was a manager who had a leadoff guy to get on base and power in the middle of the lineup. Rightly or wrongly (and Williams’s success suggests that he may have been right), that’s the way it was done; and with managers like Williams, young players had a choice: do it his way or don’t play. If Dawson was swinging at pitches to try and hit them out of the park instead of bolstering his numbers by walking fifteen more times a year, he shouldn’t be penalized for it now as his Hall of Fame candidacy is
being scrutinized by numbers that were barely paid attention to during his career by his boss.
In looking at the other successful managers from that era—-managers who were considered great at their jobs, rightly or wrongly—-they based their strategies on what they believed and their personnel. Sparky Anderson had guys like Pete Rose, Joe Morgan and Ken Griffey who got on base in front of Johnny Bench and George Foster; but it wasn’t due to anythi
ng that Anderson was demanding, that’s just the way those guys hit.
Gene Mauch was as studious a manager as you’d find, focusing on every little number and every little detail, but the only major on base guy he had was Rod Carew. Carew’s job was to get on base and score in front of Larry Hisle. Billy Martin managed Rickey Henderson from the time he arrived in the majors and Henderson, like Raines, had a job: get on base and steal; it was only later that he became the all-around hitter he was. To sit and in hindsight decry a deserving player’s candidacy because of those circumstances is changing the criteria based on a point-of-view and it’s just as bad as voting for a player based on reputation instead of hard facts.
- Why are some players rewarded for certain numbers and accomplishments (or for getting hurt), while others are punished?
Would Cal Ripken be a slam-dunk Hall of Famer without that consecutive games streak?
Would Brooks Robinson be a Hall of Famer without the reputation for fielding brilliance? Would Carlton Fisk’s numbers be sufficient to get him into the Hall of Fame had he not broken every offensive record for catchers by hanging on and continuing to play long past his sell-by date?
Why is it that Kirby Puckett and Sandy Koufax are (deservedly) rewarded with Hall enshrinement when their careers were cut short by injury and Don Mattingly, whose back prevented him from continuing his string of excellence, gets no support whatsoever? Why is it that Jim Rice’s reputation as difficult with the media was a likely part of his long wait, while a guy like Puckett—-whose gregarious nature was a cover for his true off-field behaviors and had to be known to the media—-had that aspect of his life
ignored. Mattingly and David Cone are seen as two of baseball’s all time good guys; shouldn’t they get points for that based on the arbitrary nature of the voting? And if injuries are part of the equation, then why aren’t Dawson’s terrible knees taken into account for his candidacy?
The on base percentage argument for Dawson should apply to Ripken. Ripken’s on base percentage was .340, Dawson’s .323; Ripken hit 431 homers in 3001 career games; Dawson hit 438 in 2627 career games; Ripken won two Gold Gloves and two MVPs; Dawson won eight Gold Gloves and one MVP. Would Ripken, sans streak (which late in his career was an entity in-and-of itself and a selfish detriment to the team goals) be a no-doubt Hall of Famer or a stat compiler who had to wait a few years to get in?
What about Robinson and Fisk? Robinson’s career OBP is .322; his career batting average
.267; he hit 268 homers and won 16 Gold Gloves; should he be in the Hall over contemporaries like Ron Santo and Graig Nettles? Santo was a far better hitter than Robinson and won five Gold Gloves of his own; Nettles hit 122 more homers and was almost as great a fielder as Robinson; why isn’t he in the Hall? Fisk hung around, hung around, hung around, accumulated records, never won an MVP; won one Gold Glove as a rookie; never won a World Series and was a no-doubt Hall of Famer, but why him and not Ted Simmons, who was a far better hitter than Fisk ever was?
What about a great player like Dave Winfield? Winfield’s OBP is .353; he hit 27 more homers than Dawson in over 300 more games; Winfield won seven Gold Gloves and never finished higher than third in the MVP voting; and Winfield flamed out royally in the
post-season, but was a first ballot, don’t even need to think about it, Hall of Famer. Why?
And how about a guy like Reggie Jackson? Despite his massive power numbers and post-season heroics, Reggie only had an OBP of .356 and wasn’t just a bad outfielder, he was a rotten outfielder. Why is a defensive liability like Reggie, who struck out more than anyone else, a no-doubt Hall of Famer when a guy like Edgar Martinez, who was a truly great hitter with a massive OBP, won’t get consideration because he was a DH for most of his career. So if he’s played an immobile first base with a stone glove, he’d get points for that? It takes a true team player to accept that he’s a fulltime DH, rather than demanding to be placed out on the field because he’ll have better credentials to the Hall after his career ends. The bottom line is that anyone ‘s candidacy can be scrutinized; reasons can be found to exclude just about every Hall of Famer if you look hard enough.
- The condescending zealotry:
There’s an attitude among many stat guys that if you don’t agree with them, then you’re an
idiot. If you don’t acquiesce to their way of seeing things, you aren’t a viable part of the conversation and you deserve mock and ridicule. There’s no way to convince them to see things differently because they have the “hard data” in front of them and nothing is going to change their minds.
I was an opponent of Bert Blyleven as a HOFer before looking deeply at his numbers and realizing that he was a truly great pitcher who just happened to pitch for some bad teams and in some poor luck. Had he been on the Dodgers of the 70s as Don Sutton
was, Blyleven would’ve been a first ballot, no-question Hall of Famer with 325 wins. I think Tommy John should be in the Hall of Fame, not just because of his numbers, but because he was very successful and revolutionized the game with his then-unheard of surgical procedure that now bears his name; Bruce Sutter did a similar thing with his split-fingered fastball and string of greatnes
s out of the bullpen that was similar to Koufax’s greatness as a starter—-it was short, but it made them
worthy of enshrinement.
There’s no way to argue with such fanatics because they don’t listen. They won’t be swayed because they can’t be swayed because the importance of out-of-context numbers are so ingrained in their head that they ignore other arguments since they don’t pop out of a calculator and this is just as bad as voting or not voting for a guy because of peer pressure or because he’s automatically assumed as a HOFer because of a record or because of his position or because of his reputation that have little to do with what he actually accomplished.
The problem with looking at Dawson’s numbers and denying him his rightful place (while
demanding that a guy like Raines receive the ultimate honor) is ignoring other factors like what the manager of the club was asking him to do; what his role was with the team; and focusing on his faults or injuries rather than what he accomplished.
Dawson’s a Hall of Famer in my eyes, and eventually, he’s probably going to get in, but if it were up to those who are buried under reams of statistics, he wouldn’t receive the honor and their way of determining who should be in and who should be out is just as bad as the way those who don’t put everything into the equation, except they can’t be convinced otherwise because their criteria is so ingrained, wrongly in many cases.
Enough Already With The Rice-Bashing
- Jim Rice is getting into the Hall of Fame; Jim Rice deserves to get into the Hall of
Fame; get over it!!
A simple question: Why is it that Wade Boggs made a huge chunk of his career (that resulted in induction into the Hall of Fame) by hitting singles; doubling off the Green Monster at Fenway by tailoring his swing to take advantage of the wall; walking a lot; amassing a huge batting average and batting titles and hitting for barely any power at all, and is somehow feted (never finishing any higher than fourth in the MVP voting) while Jim Rice
receives nothing but ridicule and denigration at his viable Hall of Fame candidacy?
The number of “experts” and writers who are desperately searching for reasons not to vote for Rice cling to the perceived variance of his home and away numbers; that he wasn’t intentionally walked “enough” (the number required for induction isn’t specified); that he grounded into too many double plays (the guy was slow); and that his numbers fell off the planet in his mid-30s and his career ended at 36. Instead of doing as I’ve done previously and extolling Rice’s candidacy based on what he did do (6 top-five finishes in the MVP voting; .298 career batting average; almost 2500 hits; 382 homers), let’s take a look at what the reasons he’s being refused entry.
The home/away discrepancy: So, what you’re basically saying is that because he played
in a home park with a wall that was specifically designed for a right-handed power hitter to aim at, he’s going to be punished because his numbers weren’t as gaudy away from that wall. Rice is being punished because he hit 34 fewer homers on the road than he did at home? 34? Because he hit 41 fewer doubles away from the wall?
I don’t see anyone scrutinizing Boggs’s numbers to this degree; to notice the fact the number of doubles he hit was cut almost literally in half as soon as he left the Red Sox to join the Yankees and then the Devil Rays. The home/away discrepancy for Carl Yastrzemski is almost identical to that of Rice; if Yaz were right-handed, would that have made a difference in his candidacy? Did anyone do any research as to how many of Yaz’s homers were hooked around the very inviting Pesky Pole in right field? Or how many balls he hit over or off the Green Monster? If Rice had played for the Yankees and
tailored his swing to hit the opposite way to aim for the short right-field porch and put up identical numbers, would there be this debate?
The lack of intentional walks: I don’t see how this is an argument at all. The idea that “if he was so feared, why didn’t he yield more intentional passes?” is silly. If this were to be a real argument, then some heavy-duty research would have to be done, the type of which would be realized as absurd before it was completed.
The hitters that were behind Rice has some importance. How many times was Yaz coming up to the plate behind Rice? Or Fred Lynn? Or Carlton Fisk? Or whoever? At the time of the possible intentional walk, was the hitter behind Rice on a hot streak? Was the pitcher a lefty or righty? Was the opposing manager a proponent of the strategy, or did he prefer to take his chances (oddly as the stat geeks advocate) rather than putting more runners on base? To simply look at the number of intentional walks he accrued as a stop sign to the Hall without context is like examining the tightness of various baseballs used at one time or another; there’s no way to quantify it.
His numbers collapsed in his mid-30s and his career ended at age 36: So, if he’d held
on and hung around until he was in his early-to-mid-40s as Yaz and Reggie Jackson did; accumulated another 100-120 homers; gotten to 3000 hits; wound up with numbers that are considered “Hall worthy”, then would he have been inducted ten years ago? If he’d gotten hit in the face with a pitch and been unable to continue his career as happened to Kirby Puckett, would he have been elected without argument based on what he “would” have done? Once going down that Puckett road, then Don Mattingly has a legitimate argument to have his numbers “projected”. It shouldn’t make a difference whether the injury was a back problem or a eye injury; because a player like Rice just got old in a hurry or because he got hurt.
Sandy Koufax was elected for his dominance instead of longevity; Phil Niekro is in the Hall
of Fame despite being a knuckleball pitcher with mediocre stats. Should Rice, on the basis of a hoped for election, have hung on and hit 12 homers a year until he was 43? Would there be this debate if he had?
If one looks hard enough, there can be cases made against just about every Hall of Famer that exists aside from Babe Ruth, but Rice’s candidacy invites this borderline rage and I don’t understand why. Once statements like, “the Hall of Fame is for the elite of the elite”, then they’re going to have to start kicking people out. Bill Mazeroski? Out! Phil Rizzuto? Out! Red Schoendienst? Out! Billy Williams? Out! Lou Brock? Out! Hoyt Wilhelm? Out! Pee Wee
Reese? Out!
I’m certainly no advocate of the argument
“if this guy’s in, then that guy should be in”, because that’s compounding one mistake with another, but if there are people mining deeply for reasons specifically to keep a guy like Rice out such as his home/away discrepancy or his lack of intentional walks, then that should be an indicator for his induction because the harder one looks, the more one has to stop and say, “maybe if I’m having such trouble finding reasons to keep him out, then he should be in after all”.
- The argument of Jeff Moorad keeping any part of the Padres current hierarchy:
Buster Olney put forth the possibility that Moorad might keep CEO Sandy Alderson if and
when he takes over the Padres with the following:
What will become of Padres chief executive officer Sandy Alderson?
Alderson, who is under contract through 2009, has had a remarkable
career — in both the scope of his work and his accomplishments — and
Moorad may well choose to keep him on board. Alderson is also a strong
personality with strong opinions — think Gen. George S. Patton,
without the garishness — and he tends to engender visceral reactions.
Moorad might or might not want to retain him. Presumably, the future of
Paul DePodesta is tied to that of Alderson, because it is Alderson who brought him aboard.
Even if Moorad wants to keep Alderson, I don’t see how it’s feasible to keep any part of the group that has engendered such anger at not just their disgusting on-field product, but because they’ve been so obnoxious, arrogant and disingenuous about formulating it.
They allowed manager Bruce Bochy to leave and claimed it was because of Bochy’s
perceived desire to explore his options when it was in reality because they didn’t want to pay Bochy’s salary and that he didn’t want to do as he was told by upper management. They’ve treated Trevor Hoffman—-nothing but loyal to the Padres organization his entire career—-as if they’re doing him a favor by keeping him. They’ve got a butchered farm system, an embarrassing big league roster, and little hope for the future with the current management. The notoriously laid back fans in San Diego are righteously indignant (as much as they can be) at the way this team has not only been demolished. The attitude of “we know better than you; we have the stats to back up our decisions; and we’re gonna do it this way whether you like it or not” is not the way to harbor good will no matter how supportive or laid-back a fan base is.
For no other reason than to placate an angry fan base and send a signal that there’s a new
system in place, Moorad can’t keep any current member of the Padres hierarchy. It reminds me of the New York Jets when Rich Kotite was in his last days as coach and it was unknown whether Bill Parcells was going to be available to take over; Bill Polian’s name was floated as a possibility to take over as GM and he was a fan of Kotite; Kotite was in line to get the job of the Carolina Panthers when Polian was there had Kotite not gone to the Jets.
Even if Polian had taken over the Jets and wanted to keep Kotite, he couldn’t have
done it. The Jets fans would’ve rebelled on Polian before he even started the job because of his perceived cluelessness in keeping a coach who’d become so reviled; Polian wouldn’t have been able to function as GM with the anger that would’ve been present. I’m not equating the rabid way New York fans react to their teams as the way they behave in San Diego, but it’s a similar situation. The house must be cleaned out and fumigated; keeping the group that infested it to begin with is only going to create confusion and anger. They have to go. It’s a matter of creating a bond with the fans and bringing a breath of fresh air to an organization that so desperately needs it as well as bringing in competent people.
If it’s accurate that Lowe’s agent Scott Boras has informed the Mets and other teams that it’s going to cost at least $16 million annually to get the free agent righty, then I’d wish him well and inform Boras not to contact me unless he was ready to transport back into the realm of reality.
Greg Maddux Was The Epitome Of Greatness As A Pitcher
Greg Maddux is set to announce his retirement from baseball on Monday and while he’s
been recognized for his greatness with four Cy Young Awards, eighteen Gold Glove Awards, accolades and respect, it won’t be until he’s compared to other pitchers of his era as he managed to put up absurd numbers while dealing with juiced up batters; shrinking strike zones; QuesTec; minuscule ballparks; and playing for the Cubs. Maddux’s true brilliance can be understood with the following aspects of his career that go far beyond his record of 355-227.
- He was durable beyond belief:
Every year, Maddux put up his 35 starts; every year, he delivered his 225 innings; every year, his managers—-Don Zimmer, Bobby Cox, Dusty Baker among others—-could write down in ink that Maddux was going to be out there every time his turn came up and do his job.
In today’s era of statistics and medically recommended pitch counts, limitations of young pitchers and general soreness that occurs from the unnatrual act of throwing a baseball causing widespread panic, not only did Maddux throw a lot of innings as a young pitcher, but
he racked up pitch counts that would get a manager today fired before the game ended.
Looking at Maddux’s stats doesn’t tell the entire story; it’s in looking at the number of pitches he threw in his early 20s when Cubs manager Don Zimmer just left him out there to pitch because he needed him to and didn’t yank him because of some number plucked out of the air masquerading as the “optimal” number of pitches for a young pitcher to throw.
In 1988, at the age of 21, Maddux had games in which he threw 143, 124, 134, 131, 131, 137 and…167 pitches—-and while pitchers like Joba Chamberlain and Clay Buchholz are treated like babies and wind up on the disabled list
anyway, Maddux never got hurt. His flawless mechanics played a major part in that fact, but another factor was that he never overthrew. By overthrowing I mean that he never tried to throw 95 mph; in fact, he barely ever reached 90 mph except early in his career. Maddux threw his fastball in the high 80s while his career was at its apex with the Braves and was so dominant because of his exquisite control, movement and changing speeds.
What made Maddux so great in comparison to other pitchers with stuff that would be considered superior, was that he was fearless in throwing any pitch at any time in the count. How many pitchers would have the confidence and audacity to throw a change-up with the count 3-2 in the bottom of the ninth inning and the bases loaded in a tie game? The answer? Greg Maddux.
Roger Clemens’s dominance was understandable because the confrontation with him was like a bullfight with Clemens deliberately trying to test his manhood against the batter; with Maddux, it was a chess match and he was always three or four or ten moves ahead with what
the batter was trying to do and would change strategy to keep anyone from guessing with him to the point where they would just throw their hands up in the air and do the best they could without any idea what pitch was coming.
- For a control pitcher who never walked anyone, he didn’t give up home runs:
The trade off for a control pitcher who doesn’t throw a very heavy sinking fastball a la Kevin Brown or Brandon Webb is that he gives up a lot of home runs, but Maddux never gave up an inordinate number of homers. He threw a load of innings; threw a load of pitches; spent ten years pitching with Wrigley Field as his home; and threw almost nothing but strikes and still only gave up 20+ homers six times in his career and they were all after he turned 34.
- He was unafraid of the knockdown pitch or to pitch inside:
The best example of Maddux’s fearlessness was on July 18th, 2000 when the Braves were in Tampa Bay playing the Devil Rays. In the top of the second inning, Devil Rays pitcher Bryan Rekar hit both Walt Weiss and Fernando Lunar; when the Braves built up a lead,
Maddux responded in the bottom of the fifth inning by hitting Felix Martinez; in the top of the eighth, Tanyon Sturtze hit Weiss again.
After Weiss was hit a second time, Maddux was seen in the dugout with a bewildered look on his face, shaking his head; in the bottom of the ninth, Jose Canseco—-6’4″, 240 lbs and juiced to the gills was leading off—-and on the second pitch Maddux drilled him. Canseco, shook his bat in Maddux’s direction and threatened him, but nothing of consequence happened. Many pitchers would’ve been too intimidated by Canseco’s build and reputation to use him for target practice and retaliation, but Maddux didn’t care; he threw at Canseco knowing that everyone else
realized what he was doing; knowing that the plausible deniability that is present with most pitchers due to their substandard control wouldn’t be a viable excuse; and he did it to protect his teammates without his manager having to tell him to do it and without caring who it was he was throwing at or the possible consequences.
- He wasn’t just a pitcher, he was an all-around athlete:
Never a poster boy for physical fitness, Maddux had little interest in building up beach
muscles as some players are. With a paunchy belly, skinny
arms and legs and at 5’11″, 170 lbs, Maddux looked like a guy who should’ve been directing traffic or pumping gas, but he was quite possibly the best fielding pitcher in baseball history; had the reflexes of a cat; was a great bunter; could hit enough that he wasn’t an automatic out; and ran the bases better than most everyday players.
There will be numerous references to Maddux’s brilliance, but few will mention the other aspects of his game that made him the pitcher he was. Most importantly, he’s retiring while he can still pitch. Even though his fastball is down in the 82 mph range, he’s got enough guile and natural physical ability to
pitch for a good team and be their fourth starter, winning 12 games and providing 180 innings; he’s retiring rather than hanging on for another $8 million payday.
Tom Seaver had the highest percentage of votes for induction into the Hall of Fame with 425 out of a possible 430 when he was elected (who exactly were the five who didn’t vote for Tom Seaver, I’d like to know). In five years, Greg Maddux has a chance to eclipse that number because it would be hard to find a more deserving candidate given his record and durability.
Mike Mussina Is A Hall Of Famer
I’m reprinting a portion of my blog from September 3rd regarding Mike Mussina’s Hall of Fame credentials. Mussina is a without question a Hall of Famer.
There’s a movement afoot to declare Mike Mussina’s candidacy for the Hall of Fame as![]()
assured if and only if he reaches 20 wins this season; but what if he
wins 19? Is his candidacy then going to be somehow compromised if he
doesn’t have that gaudy stat of a 20-win season on his resume?
The argument against Mussina as a Hall of Famer was always weak to
begin with. A pitcher who, as of right now, has 267 wins and is a
staggering 116 games over .500; has 23 career shutouts in an era where
such a stat is a rarity; a career ERA of 3.69 during the steroids era
and pitching the first ten years of his career in the bandbox of Camden
Yards; will have 3000 strikeouts before he retires; has been durable;
and after this season will have been voted in the top six of the Cy
Young Award balloting nine times, what does a 20th win have to do with
anything?
The same context that Goose Gossage accurately and astutely uses to compare what it
was
he and his closing brethren did in the 70s and 80s and what guys like
Dennis Eckersley and Mariano Rivera have done applies to starting
pitchers as well. Gossage says there’s no way to accurately compare the
closers like himself, Rollie Fingers and Bruce Sutter to what the
one-inning closers like Eckersley and Rivera because the job and the
edicts were totally different. Back then closers were brought into the
game as early as the sixth inning; there was no “one-inning and out”
stuff. Today there’s an uproar if Rivera has to record five outs; how
would he have functioned in 1978? This isn’t to diminish the greatness
of Rivera, but the game is totally different from what it was back then
for relievers and it’s the same for starters.
In the 70s and
80s, 36 or 37 starts for a top pitcher were the norm; how many more
wins would those four or five extra opportunities have given Mussina?
The bullpens were used much differently back then as well. With most
teams carrying thirteen pitchers nowadays, it’s easy to forget the days
where there were nine or ten pitchers on a staff and the starters had to
pitch into the seventh inning no matter the situation. The specialists
for the sixth, seventh and eighth innings that are prevalent nowadays
didn’t exist back then. It’s logical to say that a pitcher who starts
32 games and wins 17-19 would likely have won at least 21-23 if he were
given five more starts and allowed to stay in the game until the eighth
inning. By that logic, Mussina, having won at least 17 games eight
times would be a no-doubt Hall of Famer.
The argument that Mussina is a “stat-compiler” who was more of a workhorse than a great![]()
pitcher is disputed by the numbers, but it’s also disputed by
observation of the pitchers themselves. If the Hall of Fame is a haven
for pure greatness on the field and in by the numbers; if a pitcher’s
hardware—-Cy Young Awards, MVPs, World Series championships, etc.—-is
the mitigating factor, then a lot of pitchers would have to be ejected
from the place. Don Sutton was, by the accounts of hitters like Keith
Hernandez, a great pitcher whose determination, competitiveness and
creativity made him one of the toughest assignments in baseball in the
70s and 80s; is Sutton, who won 20 games once, but 17 or more six times
and was a top-five Cy Young finisher in a league with Tom Seaver and
Steve Carlton as his contemporaries, a great pitcher? If not, then
there’s an argument for Mussina to be excluded; but if Sutton’s in then
Mussina belongs as well with or without a 20-win season on his stat
sheet. If put into context, Mussina is every bit the pitcher that
Sutton or Don Drysdale were and because of that, there shouldn’t even
be a debate. Mike Mussina is a Hall of Famer.
In A Daze, In A Malaise, The Tampa Bay Rays
- Red Sox 3-Rays 0:
The Rays are staggering and stumbling toward the finish as teams who’ve had a smooth
season-long ride sometimes do; occasionally it costs them, occasionally it doesn’t. I don’t see this sudden rash of losing as affecting the team one way or the other once the playoffs start. Right now, it looks like the Red Sox are going to overtake them for the division, but all that’s going to do is change the matchups in the first round. Simply because a team has an awful close to their season doesn’t mean they’re going to continue that in the playoffs.
The Tigers and Cardinals of 2006 looked like expansion teams over the last month of that season and both wound up in the World Series; once the playoff spot is clinched (and the lead the Rays built up will ensure they’re going to make the playoffs no matter how many more games they lose), they should relax and get back to playing as well as they did earlier this season. Given the lead they built up, some adversity and guidance from the leaders in the clubhouse, how to overcome it and return to the solid baseball that got them into this position in the first place isn’t a bad thing whether or not they win the division title; making the playoffs is the most important thing and the Rays have that sewn up.
- Angels 12-Yankees 1:
The statements uttered above about the Rays may not have been so clear cut had the
Yankees and manager Joe Girardi acted more quickly to prevent Darrell Rasner from blowing the game up last Thursday—-Blog 9/5. It would be interesting to see what position the Rays would be in and how much panic would be going on if they were in the midst of a seven game losing streak.
The scuffle between the Yankees and Angels last night looked like it stemmed more from frustration on the part of the Yankees than any real animosity between the teams; it’s a bad sign that the benches cleared and the Yankees, instead of getting fired up and playing better, looked like they packed everything in and let the Angels blow them out afterwards.
Hank Steinbrenner was quoted yesterday as saying that Girardi will be back next season—-ESPN Story—-but I don’t think that’s as guaranteed as the Baby Boss implies in his statement. What happens if the Yankees collapse completely over the final eighteen games and go 6-12 or somewhere in that area and end the season at 82-80? It’s seen as almost a sure thing that Brian Cashman returns, but what happens if the Washington Nationals job opens up and the Philadelphia Phillies job is offered to him and he decides on his own to abandon ship? It’s likely that the Yankees would promote from within with Damon Oppenheimer to replace Cashman, but if they go elsewhere for a replacement, what if the new GM doesn’t want Girardi?
If George Steinbrenner were still running things, there’s no question what the end result of
this season would be; neither Cashman nor Girardi would return and the money coming off the books with the departing free agents Jason Giambi, Carl Pavano, et al would be going into the pockets of C.C. Sabathia and Mark Teixeira. People mistake Joe Torre’s unprecedentedly long reign as Yankees manager as evidence that the Boss mellowed in his old age; maybe he was slightly more patient than he would have been fifteen-to-twenty years earlier, but Torre survived for one reason—-he kept winning the World Series; other than that, he would have joined the long list of Yankee managers who were fired with or without their success and loyalty to the organization.
It’s conveniently forgotten that Torre was days (perhaps hours) away from being fired in 1998 when the team started out at 1-4; he was able to right the ship in time to save himself and make history with a team that is widely regarded as one of the best in baseball history. Will Girardi be back next season? I’d say probably, but it’s not a definite thing because if Hank gets angry enough and realizes that his bluster and threats are met with widespread skepticism and outright ridicule, he might just turn around and fire Girardi. It’s at least in the realm of possibility.
- Billy Wagner out for the rest of 2008, 2009 and perhaps for his career:
Here’s one thing I don’t understand about this diagnosis, did he tear the ligament while he was pitching that simulated game on Sunday, or was it already an undiagnosed tear? And if
it was already torn, why did it take until Monday to diagnose it after he’d seen all of those doctors to try and find out what was wrong initially? That’s neither here nor there I suppose, because it doesn’t sound like rest and rehab were going to do much good; if the ligament was going to go, it was going to go. Wagner throws very, very hard and has been durable for much of his career, so it’s no surprise that he’s got a serious arm injury as his career winds down. The thing the Mets now have to decide is what to do about a closer for 2009.
For 2008, they’re in the same position they were before Wagner was officially out for the season. I don’t think they were expecting him back when he first went on the disabled list and were looking at it as a bonus is he was going to be able to return. Luis Ayala is going to close for the rest of this season as long as he’s getting the job done and I have no problem with that. Ayala has handled the pressure, he throws strikes and has very good stuff. There are voices in the media, notably Mike Francesa on WFAN, who are implying that the Mets are walking the tightrope this season with Ayala, but in order to prove his point, he’s twisting reality to suit himself. On Sunday for example, Ayala gave up a run and it was seen to be a struggle for him to record the final three outs against the Phillies in the Mets 6-3 win. Looking at the box score and taking the situation out of context makes it appear that way, but it’s not the case.
Ayala did give up a deep drive to Andy Tracy that Endy Chavez caught by the left field wall; and he gave up a run, but the two hits he allowed traveled about a combined total of
75 feet with swinging bunts by Shane Victorino and Matt Stairs; they were lucky hits and no reflection on how well or poorly Ayala might have been pitching. From what I can see, Ayala is pitching very well and is handling the job better than anyone else the Mets have right now.
As for next year, the immediate speculation will center on the possibility of signing the impending free agent Francisco Rodriguez from the Angels or trading for Huston Street of the
Athletics. I would not pony up the $60-70 million it’s going to require to get Rodriguez. As gaudy as K-Rod’s stats are, he walks a lot of hitters; has a stressful, over-the-top motion and history has proven that importing big money closers is a wasted effort much of the time. While I don’t believe the closer-by-committee strategy can work in today’s game, I do believe that teams can develop a closer of their own inexpensively. I wouldn’t touch Street either given how shaky he’s been and the concern about his health; plus Athletics boss Billy Beane is like a predator waiting for a team like the Mets to panic if they look like they’re desperate to make a splash and bring in a recognizable name.
What I would do is sign a veteran stopgap like Todd Jones or keep Al Reyes just in case the designated closer falters. If they try to move forward with Ayala or use one of their youngsters like Eddie Kunz or Robert Parnell, then this is the correct strategy; I would also seriously consider shifting John Maine into the role next year. Spending more money or prospects on a different closer would be a big mistake because there are other viable options that would work just as well, if not better.
- How does this affect Wagner’s Hall of Fame candidacy?
This doesn’t affect Wagner’s candidacy at all because he wasn’t getting in one way or the other. Rob Neyer wrote this in his blog yesterday:
And what of Wagner? This year he’s been just about as good as ever,
when he’s been able to pitch. But how good will he be in 2010? I think
he’ll be pretty good. John Smoltz
certainly was, when he came back. But Smoltz was only 34, and Wagner
will turn 39 in 2010. Even if he’s pretty good, we can’t assume he’ll
be great. Which I’m afraid puts a real damper on his Hall of Fame
candidacy.
Billy Wagner is not a Hall of Famer. Hall of Fame voters elect closers under
protest to begin with. If the truly great closers of yesteryear like Bruce Sutter, Goose Gossage and Rollie Fingers had to wait for election, what would it say about a pretty good, but not great closer like Billy Wagner if he were even to receive serious consideration? In today’s era, Dennis Eckersley was the first of the “one-inning save” closers who got in, but that’s in part because he won a load of hardware as a closer (Cy Young Award, MVP, ALCS MVP); was a top six finisher in the Cy Young/MVP voting three other times; and was also a great starting pitcher early in his career. Mariano Rivera will get in on the first ballot because of the championship teams for whom he was an indispensable linchpin, but as for the others, it’s a big question mark.
Trevor Hoffman is often referred to as a “future Hall of Famer”, but I’m not so sure. I would have to think long and hard about voting for Hoffman because he has no hardware, has struggled in big games; he has finished in the top six of Cy Young voting four times (twice coming
in second). Hoffman has a better shot than Wagner does, but if these closers get in, it opens up a bunch of other names that would have a legitimate argument for their own induction. Those guys, including names like John Franco and Lee Smith, are not Hall of Famers. And Franco has something that Wagner doesn’t since he recorded a huge save in the playoffs by striking out Barry Bonds as the winning run at the plate in game two of the 2000 NLDS. Wagner has failed miserably in big situations time after time. This injury and the possible end to Wagner’s career doesn’t hurt or help his candidacy because he ain’t gettin’ in either way.
- Reds 5-Brewers 4:
Strategically, there’s no way to blame Brewers manager Ned Yost for this loss. He could
have left starter Dave Bush in to pitch the ninth given how shaky the Brewers bullpen has been; how well Bush pitched; and that Bush had only thrown 99 pitches, but Salomon Torres has been mostly reliable as the Brewers closer; there was no reason to think he wouldn’t be able to hold a two run lead.
That being said, the Brewers are gagging again as the season winds down and it is very possible that neither the Mets nor Phillies are going to be left out in the cold in this year’s playoff race because the Brewers are a likely candidate to collapse down the stretch. It’s indicative of Yost’s tightness that after Torres was hit with Corey Patterson’s line drive and Yost ventured onto the field to watch Torres make a couple of warm up tosses to make sure he was okay, Yost’s jaw muscles were contracting with such ferocity that he looked like he might spontaneously combust right there on the field.
Yost is eerily similar to another tightly wound manager whom the players tolerated and eventually mutinied against, former Astros and Angels manager Terry Collins. Off the field, Collins is said to be a very nice guy, but his tempestuous nature wore on the veterans in both of his
managerial stops and frightened the young players to the point that they were petrified to make a mistake. He was moderately successful because he had some talent to work with, but his teams were winning in spite of him and not because of him. In both of Collins’s chances, the players let management know that enough was enough with him and his temper. In his case, as with Yost’s, a change was needed for the talented teams to make it to the next level from potential contender to true contender. If the supremely talented Brewers falter again, it will be partially because of their bullpen, but predominately because of their manager and a change is going to have to be made to someone more temperate if they want to win when it counts.
Recent Comments