Why Did La Russa Stay In St. Louis?
There’s something to be said for being comfortable in one’s surroundings, but with the stories about the Cardinals that are popping up and how the upper management is in constant disagreement and completely disregards manager Tony La Russa’s personnel suggestions, one has to wonder why La Russa didn’t cut the ties when he was a free agent after last season.
The Cardinals front office and manager don’t appear to be—-in the words of the Moneyball legend Paul DePodesta—-"on the same page". It’s understandable why the front office rejected La Russa’s Barry Bonds suggestion for a myriad of reasons, but there seems to be a disconnect between ownership and some of the staff that wants to go in the Moneyball direction (the Billy Beane Moneyball, not any of the other teams that have used the strategies and failed miserably), while La Russa, GM John Mozeliak and former GM Walt Jocketty wanted to conduct their business in the same way they always have. The idea that La Russa has any power remaining in the organization is rapidly declining. The Cardinals dumped Scott Rolen, but that probably had more to do with his contract and injuries than any fissure between Rolen and La Russa.
There were potential job openings last fall that La Russa would have been perfect for. He could have gone to the Mariners, the Orioles, the Reds, the Dodgers or even the Yankees. If he truly wanted to find the perfect job for himself, he could have sat out the beginning of the season and waited for the shoe to drop on such names on the firing line as Ned Yost with the Brewers, Ozzie Guillen with the White Sox or Willie Randolph with the Mets. Any of these teams have a better chance to win this season than the Cardinals do judging by their roster.
At his age, La Russa probably doesn’t want to have to go to another organization in another town and start all over again; and with two championships in his pocket and a spot in the Hall of Fame assured, perhaps there’s a part of La Russa that wants to challenge himself and see how far he can take a team with such limited talent, but does he need the aggravation and the castrating tendency of a Moneyball based system? Of having his suggestions dismissed out of hand with no regard for his opinion one way or the other? I can see a young manager putting up with such **** to go along and get along, but La Russa doesn’t have to take it, so why would he choose to?
princeofny
“…the Billy Beane Moneyball, not any of the other teams that have used the strategies and failed miserably”
Are you suggesting there’s no one using Moneyball tenets(other than Beane)with any success? Most teams, indeed most successful teams, are increasingly incorporating Moneyball principles. The Dbacks and Red Sox are notably strong adherents.
I’m not suggesting Lewis invented any of this – he just reported(and glorified) some of the ideas – but this preference for data over visual observation is a revolution I dont see ending anytime soon.
http://azdiamondhacks.mlblogs.com/
I differentiate between “Billy Beane Moneyball” and “Michael Lewis Moneyball”. Beane isn’t beholden to Lewis’s bit of creative non-fiction. I don’t consider Josh Byrnes a strict Moneyball advocate considering his body of work. Some teams are using the strategy to mask being cheap, hence the Cardinals and Padres; others are using it when it’s convenient for them in an effort to make themselves look smart, hence the Red Sox with J.D. Drew, Julio Lugo, Matt Clement, the bullpen by committee, etc. I don’t see how you can consider the Red Sox, who throw money at their problems when the fans get agitated, a Moneyball team. Was throwing all that money at Daisuke Matsuzaka a Moneyball move considering they’d never seen him pitch?
A team needn’t suffer Oakland’s revenue constraints to utilize Moneyball principles. Just one example: the Yanks and Red Sox have led the AL in payroll every one of the past five years. They also went 1-2 in league On Base % every single one of those yrs. They didnt lead in Runs Scored every year (although they both did well). They didnt lead in SLG% every year. They didnt lead in HRs every year. They valued OBP in particular, had the ability to pay for it, and obtained it.
Contrast that with the NL’s payroll leader during that period – the Mets. Their team OBP languished near league bottom 2003-2005, then finally improved under Minaya. I understand there’s other things to consider, like park effects, but I think it’s fair to say the Red Sox & NYY put a higher premium on OBP than the Mets did. We can say it’s a philosophical difference because none of these teams are burdened by most teams’ financial constraints. They basically get what they want and they wanted different things.
Statistics can’t account for guys who just can’t play even though they may have a stat or two that indicates they could be useful. The Mets of the pre-Minaya years had a bunch of guys who couldn’t play. The teams that insist on signing guys like JD Drew point to his OBP as a reason for his value, but the guy just isn’t any good over the long haul and especially for his bloated salary. I think a main problem with this type of discussion is that the strategies of using the sabermetric stats are now so attached to Moneyball, that there’s no longer a way to separate the two. The strategies ARE sound; the book is horse(bleep) because it cherry picks to try and prove a point.
Cherry picks how? I think Lewis’s thesis is that the A’s succeeded in the face of daunting financial constraints for two reasons:
1. They developed & exploited knowledge rooted in empirical data better and sooner than their competitors.
2. Beane’s controlling nature and also his recognition of his own failures as a player.
I know Lewis glosses over managerial and coaching skills, but so does Beane. Strictly in terms of roster composition and in game strategy(ie dont steal bases, dont sac bunt, etc), I think Lewis makes a very convincing, if somewhat specific, case for Oakland’s improbable success.
Beane IS a genius, but not because Michael Lewis presents him that way. The book: Assassinates the character of Art Howe as a “villain” of the new way of doing business in baseball; ignores important facts about the draft (including the draft that Lewis was observing); is an empirical failure based on the after-the-fact teams who have used the Moneyball model such as the Dodgers, Blue Jays, Red Sox, Padres, Rangers and Devil Rays; and twists things, oh so subtly, to make his point appear to be proven more effectively than it is.
And you may think I’m joking about this next point, but I’m not: Any writer who puts a gigantic picture of his own face on the back cover of his book is someone whose ego is bound to get in the way of straight reporting or anything remotely even-handed.
And when you read the biography of Bill James, you’ll see the slight adjustments Lewis makes to the man himself and to his theories. You can’t miss them.
“You cant miss them”
dont be so sure. I may need your help
I think Lewis portrays Howe as superfluous to the A’s success, but a villain? Sorry, I missed that.
What “important” facts did Lewis leave out re draft day? That was the most exciting part of the book. I’m curious.
“The book.. is an empirical failure…”
Oh, come on. You yourself acknowledege “the strategies are sound”. Doesnt Lewis emphasize that Beane’s unique abilities and background are a critical part of the A’s success and not easily replicated?
Claiming the Dodgers are a Moneyball team kind of takes my breath away. Juan Pierre, Nomar, Andruw Jones? The Dodgers not only overpay – they overpay for the wrong skills. At least the BoSox overpay for the right ones. In theory.